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The Appalachian region is a coal-producing area that has been
environmentally devastated over the years by the effects of coal min-
ing and fossil fuel extraction. One problem has been that fossil fuel
companies and mine operators have been granted tax incentives to ex-
tract the minerals, but little money has gone back into preserving the
environment from whence the minerals came. One of the most sig-
nificant tax incentives, and the subject of this article, is the "depletion
deduction," codified in Internal Revenue Code section 611.
The depletion deduction allows fossil fuel companies and mine
operators to deduct an amount equal to the reduction in value of their
mineral reserves as the mineral is extracted and sold.' The deduction
is intended to allow the taxpayer to recover his capital investment so
that it will not be impaired as the minerals are extracted and sold.2
Notwithstanding this purpose, the taxpayer need not have invested
any money in the mineral rights, and legal title is not required in order
to take advantage of the deduction.3 Both the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (I.R.S.) and the taxpayers who extract oil or mine coal have been
in mutual agreement for nearly a decade regarding the entitlement to a
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1. I.R.C. § 611 (2000).
2. Comm'r v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308, 312 (1956).
3. Goodfellow v. Comm'r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1733 (2002), No. 8469-00, 2002 WL
1063925, at *4 (U.S. Tax Ct. May 28, 2002) (citing Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Comm'r, 326 U.S.
599, 603 (1946).
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deduction for the depletion of the operator's fossil fuel reserves pursu-
ant to section 611. Through the depletion deduction, fossil fuel ex-
4ploiters avoid approximately $10 billion in taxes every year.
In past decades, a significant number of cases have examined
whether mineral rights operators who did not own the surface land,
and in many cases had no title to the minerals, were entitled to the de-
duction.' Although there have been fewer reported cases in recent
years, as well as little debate regarding whether the operator or surface
owner was entitled to the deduction, it is time to take a step back to
reexamine the wisdom of allowing depletion deductions for mineral
rights. The rising costs of fossil fuels and expected fuel shortages,
coupled with the recent emergence of technologically feasible and eco-
nomically viable renewable energy sources, make this a timely topic.
The mineral depletion deduction is a unique one. Other busi-
nesses are not allowed to deduct the reduction in value of their raw
materials or inventory as they sell their products. For example, bakers
are not allowed a deduction for the depletion of their flour supply, and
boat builders are not allowed a deduction for the depletion of their
boat inventory, nor even for the parts that go into the finished boats.
So why are mineral extractors granted a deduction for depletion of
their product as it is extracted?
This article argues that the depletion deduction provision is a
misguided incentive that has been falsely analogized and justified, and
it should be abolished in order to provide funds to protect and pre-
serve the environment. The additional revenue generated should be
used to encourage the development of renewable resources and to
remediate the harm caused by the extraction and use of fossil fuels.
Specifically, the depletion deduction for reduction in the supply of
nonrenewable resources such as coal and oil should be eliminated to
(1) ensure certain and equal treatment under the tax laws; (2) encour-
age development of renewable energy resources thereby abating fur-
ther environmental harm caused by mining and extraction of fossil fu-
els; and (3) increase tax revenue to fund reparations for damages
caused by coal mining and oil extraction.
4. I.R.S., PUB. No. 1136, 21 STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN 79, 122 (2001) [hereinaf-
ter I.R.S. STATISTICS BULLETIN].
5. Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Licensees and Economic Interest in Minerals After Swank and
Revenue Ruling 83-160, 72 KY. L.J. 787 (1983/1984) (discussing the economic interest test used
to determine eligibility for the depletion deduction) [hereinafter After Swank]; see also Martin J.
McMahon, Jr., A Capsule View of the History and Importance of the Economic Interest Concept in
Mineral Taxation, 27 TULSA L.J. 313 (1992) [hereinafter Capsule View].
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In order to provide the reader with a greater understanding of the
characteristics of the depletion deduction, Part II compares the min-
eral depletion deduction with the standard business depreciation tax
deduction. Part III examines in greater detail the benefits that would
be realized from eliminating the depletion deduction, including ensur-
ing greater certainty and equal treatment in the law, encouraging the
use and development of renewable resources, and increasing tax reve-
nues that might be used to repair some of the damages done to the en-
vironment and society by fossil fuel extraction. Part IV sums up the
issues in a conclusion.
II. DEPLETION VS. DEPRECIATION
The depletion deduction is often compared to the depreciation
deduction available to businesses.6 In actuality, the purposes of the
two deductions are different because they deal with different types of
assets.7 Moreover, the depletion deduction results in unequal treat-
ment under the tax laws.
When a tangible business asset is used to perform services or
produce products, the cost of the asset may be depreciated over time
by the taxpayer.8 If the business asset has a useful life of more than
one year, the asset cannot be deducted as an expense in one year, but it
may be deducted over a number of years through depreciation.9 The
purpose of the depreciation deduction is to accurately report income; if
the asset were deducted as an expense in one year, then income for
that year would be distorted to appear less than it actually is."0
In comparison, the depletion deduction is available only to busi-
nesses that extract natural resources such as coal and other minerals,
oil and gas, geothermal deposits, and standing timber." The deple-
tion deduction is calculated in one of two ways: 2 by means of the
"cost depletion" method 3 or the "percentage depletion" method. 4
6. See, e.g., Parsons v. Smith, 359 U.S. 215, 221 (1959).
7. See United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. 571, 576 (1981); see also JACOB MERTENS JR.,
LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 24:01, 24-27 n.3 (West 2000) (noting the depletion
deduction's purpose is to encourage the further development and exploitation of certain natural
resources).
8. CCH ED. STAFF, FEDERAL TAX COURSE 2001 (CCH) 700, at 703 (2001) [hereinafter
FEDERAL TAX COURSE 2001].
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. 700, at 704.
12. Id. 788, at 761.
13. Id. 789, at 761; see also I.R.C. § 612 (2000) (defines the basis of cost depletion).
14. FEDERAL TAX COURSE 2001,supra note 8, 790, at 764; see also I.R.C. § 613(a) (2000)
(defines general rule for percentage depletion).
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Cost depletion is calculated by dividing the cost of the mineral rights
by the number of tons of ore estimated in the property, multiplied by
the number of tons extracted and sold that tax year.15 Percentage de-
pletion, on the other hand, is calculated by multiplying the gross in-
come by a figure set by the I.R.S. 6 The reasons for favoring one cal-
culation over the other depend upon on income, reserves, and other
factors specific to each mineral rights owner.
No matter which computation method is used, the depletion de-
duction is still different in character and effect from the depreciation
deduction. One primary difference is in the type of assets to which
each deduction applies. The depreciation deduction compensates the
taxpayer for the capital loss that accrues when an asset that is used to
produce a product or provide a service declines in value with age. 7 In
contrast, the depletion deduction for minerals or other natural re-
sources compensates taxpayers for reduced value of assets that are not
used to produce a product, but instead are the product." The minerals
are the raw materials or inventory used by the taxpayer. In this way,
the depreciation deduction and the depletion deduction are very dif-
ferent.
A second difference between the two deductions is that, unlike
taxpayers utilizing the depreciation deduction, fossil fuel exploiters are
allowed to deduct for double the value of their assets. A significant
number of mineral extractors lease, rather than own, their mineral
rights, and therefore can deduct the lease payments as business ex-
penses.' 9 Allowing a deduction for the depletion of the asset as well as
for the lease payments results in the deduction exceeding the initial
investment in the asset.
This article does not propose to eliminate all deductions cur-
rently allowed mine operators and fossil fuel companies. Those tax-
payers retain the deductions for expenses related to the development
of mines or other natural deposits" and for intangible drilling costs,
2'
11. FEDERAL TAX COURSE 2001,supra note 8, 789, at 761.
16. Gross income is multiplied by 10% for coal (limited to 50% of the taxable income) or
100% for oil and gas. Id. 790, at 764 (explaining computation provided in I.R.C. § 613(a)).
17. Id. 700, at 703.
18. Seeid. 788,at 761.
19. See I.R.C. § 162(a)(3) ("There shall be allowed as a deduction ... rentals or other pay-
ments required to be made as a condition to the continued use or possession, for purposes of the
trade or business, of property to which the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title or in
which he has no equity.").
20. See I.R.C. § 616 (2000).
21. See I.R.C. § 312(n)(2).
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as well as the credit for investment in fossil fuels. 22 There are also sig-
nificant state tax incentives for investing in fossil fuels that remain vi-
able; for example, some states provide tax incentives when electricity-
generating stations utilize coal mined in-state.23 Although many of the
arguments used against the depletion deduction could also be applied
to oppose these alternative tax incentive provisions, this article is lim-
ited to the federal income tax depletion deduction.
III. BENEFITS OF ELIMINATING THE DEPLETION DEDUCTION
Eliminating the depletion deduction would ensure certainty and
equal treatment under the tax laws; encourage the development of re-
newable energy sources, thereby abating further environmental harm
caused by mining and extraction of fossil fuels; and create increased
tax revenue to fund reparations for damages caused by coal mining
and oil extraction. Each of these benefits is examined in turn below.
A. Ensure Certainty and Equal Treatment Under the Current Tax Laws
The depletion deduction has caused a significant amount of liti-
gation in past decades because of the lack of clarity as to who-the
landowner or the lessee of the mineral rights who extracts the coal or
other minerals-is entitled to the deduction.24  Courts have consis-
tently held that the owners of an "economic interest" are entitled to
the deduction, while the owners of an "economic advantage" are not
so entitled.2 5
I.R.S. regulations interpret section 611 to allow a depletion de-
duction only if the taxpayer has an economic interest in the mineral
rights, as opposed to a mere economic advantage.16  In Parsons v.
Smith, the Supreme Court found that taxpayers having an economic
interest were entitled to a depletion deduction even if they were merely
lessees of the mineral property.2 7 The Court examined seven factors
to determine whether the lessee had an economic interest in the min-
eral rights and was therefore entitled to the deduction.2" According to
the Parsons Court, the depletion deduction is denied to a tax-
22. See I.R.C. § 29.
23. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-2626.1(A) (Michie 2001).
24. See Capsule View, supra note 5 (discussing the evolution of the economic interest rule
over twelve cases); After Swank, supra note 5.
25. Parsons, 359 U.S. at 221-22 & n.7 (citing the line of cases distinguishing economic in-
terest from economic advantage).
26. 26 C.F.R. § 1.611-1(b)(1) (2001).
27. Parsons, 359 U.S. at 220-21.
28. Id. at 225.
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payer/lessee if: 1) the taxpayer's investment is in equipment, not in
the coal or mineral in place; 2) the equipment investments are recover-
able through depreciation; 3) the contracts are terminable without
cause on short notice (according to the Swank29 Court and later private
letter rulings, this fact alone is not determinative); 4) the landowners
did not surrender any capital interest in the coal in place; 5) the coal
belonged to the landowners even after extraction; 6) the taxpayer was
paid a fixed sum for extraction and did not participate in the proceeds
of the sale of the coal; and 7) the taxpayer looked solely to the land-
owner for payment, not to the sale of coal.3"
The Parsons Court denied the depletion deduction to coal strip-
mine contractors who did not have an ownership interest in the coal.3
The taxpayer contractors, normally employed as road-builders, had
entered into a short-term oral agreement, terminable at the will of the
landowner, to strip mine the coal on designated tracts of land.32 The
taxpayers were paid a fixed amount for each ton of coal extracted, re-
gardless of the ultimate selling price obtained by the landowner.33
In disallowing the deduction, the Court stated that the purpose
of the depletion deduction is to compensate the owner for the part of a
wasting asset that is used in production,34 and that the deduction was
designed to allow the owner's capital investment to remain unimpaired
as the minerals are exhausted." The Court also noted that the deci-
sion whether to allow the deduction was "entirely a matter of grace,"
36
thereby placing the burden of proof of an economic interest-and thus
entitlement--on the taxpayer. 37 Ignoring the issues of who had legal
title to the land or the underlying minerals, the Court instead focused
on the right to share in the minerals extracted and on the other factors
listed above.38
Given that the contracts at issue in Parsons were terminable by
the landowner without cause on short notice, the Court held that the
lessee taxpayers had no economic interest or capital investment in the
coal.39 However, the Court left the door open for similarly situated
29. Swank, 451 U.S. 571.
30. Parsons, 359 U.S. at 225.
31. Id. at 226.
32. Id. at 216-17.
33. Id. at 217.
34. Id. at 220.
35. Id. at 220 (quoting Comm'r v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308, 312 (1956)).
36. Id. at 219.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 221.
39. Id. at 224.
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lessee operators to negotiate for the entitlement to the deduction when
it stated, "[o]f course, the parties might have provided in their con-
tracts that petitioners would have some capital interest in the coal in
place, but they did not do so-apparently by design."4 The denial of
the deduction only applied to the lessee/coal operator; the deduction
still remained available to the holder of the economic interest-in this
case, the landowner.4'
Following the Court's suggestion in Parsons, a contractual as-
signment of the deduction entitlement may persuade a court to allow
the deduction for a lessee. In a 1980 Private Letter Ruling, a taxpayer
successfully followed the suggestion of the Parsons Court by stipulat-
ing in the lease contract that the taxpayer/lessee was entitled to the
deduction.42 Similarly, a 1998 Field Service Advisory allowed the de-
duction where the taxpayer had an agreement with its lessor that the
taxpayer would take all depletion deductions.43 In that case, the tax-
payer was a mine operator and a lessee of mineral reserves who was to
sell all mined minerals to the lessor. The lessor bore all costs of ma-
chinery and equipment and could terminate the agreement at will.
The I.R.S. supported this decision by noting that the taxpayer "looked
to the minerals for a return of its capital investment."44 The I.R.S.
placed great weight on the fact that the taxpayer had purchased the
mineral leases and subleases. Because the taxpayer had an investment
in the minerals themselves, the deduction was allowed.45
After standing untouched for twenty years, the Parsons test was
modified in United States v. Swank.46 The modification allowed lessee
taxpayers to deduct for depletion in a broader range of circumstances.
Specifically, the Court held that the I.R.S. could not deny the deduc-
tion to an otherwise eligible lessee/taxpayer merely because the lease
was subject to termination on short notice. 7 The facts in Swank are
substantially different from those in Parsons. In Swank, the taxpayer
invested significant sums of money on nonmovable assets such as ac-
cess roads and the tipple,48 and the taxpayer sold the coal at whatever
40. Id. at 226.
41. Parsons, 359 U.S. at 220-21; see also Swank, 451 U.S. at 578-79 & n.11.
42. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-38-161 (June 30, 1980).
43. I.R.S. Field Service Advisory, 1998 WL 1984206 (June 9, 1998).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 451 U.S. 571, 579 (1981) (White, J., dissenting).
47. Swank, 451 U.S. at 585.
48. Id. at 574-75. A coal tipple is a structure used for loading extracted coal onto trucks or
other transport vehicles.
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price the market would bear, paying a royalty to the lessor.49 The
Court affirmed a Court of Claims decision in favor of the taxpayer,
which reversed the original I.R.S. denial of the deduction."0
In his dissent, Justice White, joined by Justice Stewart, agreed
that any right to a depletion allowance must be based on a capital in-
vestment in the minerals in place." However, because the I.R.S. had
determined that a short-term revocable lease was not a sufficient eco-
nomic interest to justify the depletion deduction, the dissent deter-
mined that the I.R.S. interpretation of its own regulation should be
given deference.5 2 The dissent also found the market risk analysis to
be unpersuasive based on the reasoning of earlier decisions that re-
quired a more in-depth analysis of all seven Parsons factors used to de-
termine whether an economic interest exists. 3 The dissent noted that
the market risk analysis was illusory in nature because it was "depend-
ent on the lessor's willingness to permit continued extraction of the
coal." 4 It is this type of conflict that undermines the certainty of the
tax obligation and favors elimination of the depletion deduction as un-
certain and confusing.
In a technical advice memorandum issued the same year as
Swank, the I.R.S. further broadened the definition of economic inter-
est. 5 Even though the landowner in that case guaranteed a base price
for the coal extracted by the taxpayer/operators, and even though the
taxpayer had no control over the sale of the coal, the I.R.S. found the
taxpayer entitled to the depletion deduction. 6 The term of the tax-
payer's exclusive right to mine was "until all [the] ... coal has been
mined.
'5 7
A later revenue ruling broadened the Swank rule, holding that
the terminability of a mineral lease at the will of the lessor is not a de-
ciding factor, and that there is no minimum period during which the
lessee must have a right to extract minerals to prove an economic in-
terest. 58
The lack of certainty regarding entitlement to the depletion de-
duction continues to cause litigation, costing taxpayers considerable
49. Id. at 582-83.
50. Id. at 585.
51. Id. at 586.
52. Id. at 586 (White, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 593-94.
54. Id.
55. Tech. Adv. Mer., 82-16-007 (Dec. 7, 1981).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Rev, Rul. 83-160, 1983-2 C.B. 99, 1983 WL 190203 IRS RRU.
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expense. In one of only a few recent cases where the depletion deduc-
tion was denied, the taxpayer claimed depletion of excavated materials
that were subsequently discarded by the landowner.59 The court rec-
ognized that under Parsons, the taxpayer has the burden of proving
entitlement to the deduction, and that the deduction is a matter of leg-
islative grace. The purpose of the deduction is "to compensate a tax-
payer for minerals consumed in the production of income resulting
from extraction,"" "so that when the minerals are exhausted, the tax-
payer's investment in the mineral deposit remains unimpaired."6 The
court noted the lack of investment in the discarded materials and their
low value.62 This attempted manipulation of the tax laws-claiming
depletion of worthless discards-should be avoided by eliminating the
depletion deduction altogether.
As the above cases illustrate, the depletion deduction's ambiguity
is evident in situations where the taxpayer is a lessee because of the
conflict between landowners and lessees as to who is entitled to the
deduction.63 The result is even less certain and less fair when the les-
see/mine operator is paying a rental payment calculated to reflect the
amount of the mineral present, has already been allowed to deduct the
rental payments as a business expense, 64 and then may be allowed to
deduct the total rental payments as depletion of the minerals when the
lessee extracts the minerals. This is not an unusual situation given
that the vast majority of mineral lands are leased to operators, rather
than mined by owners.
Although some tax experts would disagree with manipulation of
the tax laws to foster social change, the tax laws have been used in this
way throughout history. Taxes are added to cigarettes 65 and alcohol
66
to discourage the harmful effects of smoking and drinking. Luxury
taxes are added to expensive automobiles. 67 The use of a graduated
scale for income tax is an attempt to redistribute wealth, taxing the
wealthy at a higher rate. Eliminating the depletion deduction would
also impact taxpayer behavior. Fossil fuel operators would be unable
to deduct from taxable income the reduced stock of coal or other min-
erals, and so would report a higher taxable income, resulting in greater
59. GoodfeUow, 2002 WL 1063925, at *3.
60. Id. at *4 (citing Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 308, 313-14 (1940)).
61. Id. (citing Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Comm'r, 380 U.s. 624 (1965)).
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., id.
64. See I.R.C. § 162(a)(3) (2000).
65. I.R.C. § 5701 (2000).
66. I.R.C. § 5001 (2000).
67. I.R.C. § 4001 (2000).
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revenue. The operators may argue that their taxable income would
thus be artificially inflated, as the reduction in their capital investment
is not taken into account. However, this is no different from adding
additional taxes to cigarettes and alcohol that are not added to other
consumables. The tax laws have been used in each instance to affect
consumption.
The depletion deduction results in a significant reduction in tax
revenue for the government, and an increase in net income for the tax-
payers. In 1999, partnerships with net income deducted a total of
$338,567,000 for depletion, with mining accounting for $259,469,000
of that total.6" In 1998, corporate income tax returns included a total
deduction of $9,685,686,000 for depletion. 69 If the depletion deduc-
tion were eliminated, nearly $10 billion in additional revenue could be
collected per year and used to both develop renewable energy sources
and repair the damage caused by mining and oil drilling. This statistic
excludes the value of other incentives and allocations granted to the
fossil fuel companies. In 1993, tax breaks and other subsidies to the
fossil fuel industry cost the government $20 billion per year °.7  The
United States government "contributed nearly $3 billion to the devel-
opment of new coal-burning technologies through the Clean Coal
Technology Program." 1 This legislative support of fossil fuels con-
tinues in the Energy Policy Act of 2002.
B. Encourage the Development of Renewable Energy Sources
Elimination of the depletion deduction will make coal and oil
more costly, thereby encouraging the use of alternative energy
sources. 72
The United States is responsible for nearly one-fourth of the
world's energy consumption. The vast majority of its energy
68. I.R.S. STATISTICS BULLETIN, supra note 4.
69. Id. at 199. Total depletion deductions taken by corporations in 1980-1998 averaged
$9.3 billion.
70. JOHN J. BERGER, CHARGING AHEAD 10 (1997) (citing DOUGLAS N. KOPLOW,
FEDERAL ENERGY SUBSIDIES, ENERGY, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND FISCAL IMPACTS (1993)).
71. Blair G. Swezey & Yih-huei Wan, The True Cost of Renewables: An Analytic Response to
the Coal Industry's Attack on Renewable Energy, National Renewable Energy Lab., U.S. Dep't of
Energy, at http://www.nrel.gov/analysis/emaa/pubs/ceed/ceed.html (last visited Nov. 15,
2002).
72. The author acknowledges that certain tax incentives currently exist for renewable re-
sources, including credit for electricity produced by wind or biowaste. I.R.C. § 45 (2001). How-
ever, the tax incentives for fossil fuels far exceed the tax incentives available for renewable energy
sources. Because of the damage caused by fossil fuel combustion, the public policy should be
reversed to favor renewable energy sources.
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supplies comes from fossil fuel sources such as coal, oil, and
natural gas .... Federal policies targeted at mineral and energy
source protection have included regulation of the price of natural
gas and other commodities, [and] subsidization of oil exploration
and nuclear development .... However, the United States has
never had a comprehensive energy policy and today continues its
precarious reliance on fossil fuels."
A study by Shell International Petroleum Corporation predicts
that renewable energy sources may be providing almost as much en-
ergy as all fossil fuels and nuclear energy combined by 2050. 7"
1. Recent Legislation
Although there are recent efforts in Congress to support funding
of renewable energy resource research and development, more needs
to be done. The potential effect of pending legislation, the Energy
Policy Act of 2002, is to limit funding available for renewable resource
research and development and to artificially deflate the costs of fossil
fuels.
Congress intended the Energy Policy Act of 2002, 7 a compre-
hensive proposal to provide energy tax incentives, to be a step in the
right direction by encouraging the development of cleaner energy
sources. 76  The bill, which is still being considered by the Senate,
would appropriate $500 million in fiscal year 2003 for research and
development of enhanced renewable energies including wind, photo-
voltaics, geothermal, and biofuels.7 7 This $500 million allocation for
renewable energies development is in stark contrast to the nearly $1.4
billion appropriated for fossil fuels, including $697 million appropri-
ated in the Act for development of onshore oil exploration and
production technologies, the $485 million for natural gas
technologies, 78 the $200 million for coal-based power plant improve-
ments, 79 and the $12 million for advanced coal mining technology. 0
73. William R. Lowry, Natural Resource Policies in the Twenty-First Century, in
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 303, 307 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 4th ed. 2000).
74. BERGER, supra note 70, at xv.
75. Energy Policy Act of 2002, Engrossed Senate Amend., H.R. 4, 107th Cong. (2002),
WL 2001 CONG US HR 4.
76. Id. at 1 (noting that the bill's purpose is "[t]o enhance energy conservation, research
and development and to provide for security and diversity in the energy supply for the American
people, and for other purposes").
77. Id. § 1221(e)(1).
78. Id. § 1231(c)(1)(A).
79. Id. § 1232(e)(1).
80. Id. § 1233(b).
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Congress continues to support the fossil fuel industry by provid-
ing funding, tax credits, deductions, and loans that artificially decrease
the costs of these fuels, making renewable energy sources appear more
expensive. This policy should be reversed, with more funding pro-
vided for the research and development of renewable resources to re-
duce the environmental harm caused by the use of fossil fuels.
2. Economic Advantages of Renewable Resources
As coal, oil, and other fossil fuels become more expensive follow-
ing the elimination of the depletion deduction and the removal of arti-
ficial price supports, renewable energy sources will become more com-
petitively priced. Affordable renewable energy would improve the
economy, environment, and public health because (1) the threat of
shortages, price increases, and political embargoes will subside follow-
ing the removal of reliance on fossil fuels;8 (2) smog and acid rain
would be eliminated or reduced because combustion would not be
necessary;8 2 and (3) the threat of global warming would be abated.83
Renewable resources are becoming more economical84 and could
become cheaper than fossil fuels if the tax incentives for nonrenewable
energy sources were eliminated.88 Currently, oil and coal prices are
kept artificially low by the depletion deduction, among other tax in-
centives.86 In comparison, solar cell panels that cost $1,000 per watt in
the 1960s declined to only $4.00 per watt by the mid-1990s, with the
cost likely to decline even further in the future.87 "Wind already pro-
vides energy more cheaply than many oil, coal, and nuclear-fired
power plants."88 Today, hydropower can produce electricity at seven-
tenths of a cent per kilowatt-hour. That equates to one-third the cost
of fossil fuel or nuclear-generated electricity, and one-sixth the cost of
natural gas, according to the Wisconsin Valley Improvement Author-
ity.8 9 Even with the artificially reduced costs of fossil fuels, renewable
81. BERGER, supra note 70, at 3-4.
82. Id. at 4.
83. Id.
84. See Claudine Schneider, Changing Our Ways or Changing the Earth's Climate, 19
ENVTL. L. REP. 10208 (1989) (discussing the damages of global warming caused by fossil fuel
combustion and the lack of funding for research into renewable energy sources).
85. BERGER, supra note 70, at 6.
86. RICHARD L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING OURSELVES
296 (1999); see also Swezey & Wan, supra note 71, at 4.
87. BERGER, supra note 70, at 5.
88. Karl Mallon et al., Breaking the Solar Impasse: A Briefing from Greenpeace (Sept. 1999),
at http://archive.greenpeace.org/-climate/renewables/reports/kpmgbrief.pdf
89. See Wisconsin Valley Improvement Co., Facts About Hydropower, at http://www.wvic.
com/hydro-facts.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2002).
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resources are cost-competitive when the cost of fossil fuel's harm to
the environment is taken into account. 90
3. Environmental Harm Caused by Coal Mining and Use of Fossil
Fuels
Coal mining pollutes the air and streams, and destroys drinking
water springs9 and surface land through subsidence cracks and
floods. 92 Coal operations negatively impact the surface owner's ability
to farm or use their land by building haulage roads wherever conven-
ient to the coal operations, drilling gas wells with miles of pipes to
drain away the methane gas, and adding tipples, buildings, and other
structures as necessary or convenient to their businesses.
Coal mining operations cause water, air, and aesthetic pollution
of the Appalachian region, where much of the nation's coal is mined.93
Coal operations cause black lung disease, cancer, eye problems, and
other health effects on both miners and residents living near the coal-
fields. Back pain and repetitive motion injuries are also common for
94miners.
Fossil fuel combustion causes air pollution that costs $150 billion
per year in damages,95 including $4 billion per year that electricity
consumers will be required to pay under the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990.96 The Energy Policy Act of 2002 appropriates $3.9
billion for removal of greenhouse gases from the atmosphere, caused
by fossil fuel combustion.97 Oil spills are also an environmental risk
and an expected hazard when transporting fossil fuels. Nuclear energy
90. BERGER, supra note 70, at 6; see also Swezey &Wan, supra note 71, at 2-3.
91. BERGER, supra note 70, at 11.
92. See, e.g., Large v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 387 S.E.2d 784, 784-85 (Va. 1990); see also
CAROL A.B. GIESEN, COAL MINERS' WIVES: PORTRAITS OF ENDURANCE (1995).
93. See, e.g., GIESEN, supra note 92.
94. See id. at 56; Wendy B. Davis, Out of the Black Hole: Reclaiming the Crown of King
Coal, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 905, 952-53 (2002).
95. BERGER, supra note 70, at 10 (citing F. Barber et al., Environmental Damage Due to Fos-
sil Fuels Use, 15 INT'L J. OF HYDROGEN ENERGY (1990)); see also Technologies for Remediating
Global Warming: Hearing Before the Natural Resources, Agriculture Research and Environment
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology, H.R. DOC. NO. 100-137, at
142, 149 (1988) (statement of T. Nejat Veziroglu) (estimating that fossil fuel combustion costs
the United States several hundred billion dollars per year in environmental destruction, public
health impacts, and economic losses to property and commodities).
96. Swezey & Wan, supra note 71, at 4.
97. Energy Policy Act of 2002, supra note 75, § 1015.
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is not the answer because of construction cost overruns, catastrophic
accident risks, and radioactive waste disposal issues.9"
Renewable energy sources such as solar, wind, and hydropower
are the only reasonable solution. These alternative sources should be
encouraged by tax incentives, rather than encouraging the use of fossil
fuels through continued incentives like the depletion deduction.
Eliminating the depletion deduction would increase tax revenues that
could be allocated for remediation of the environmental harm caused
by the combustion of fossil fuels.
C. Increased Tax Revenues Could Fund Reparations to Appalachia
Supplying coal to power the industry of this nation has taken a
toll on the land and the residents of the coalfields in Appalachia. A
portion of the tax revenues generated by eliminating the depletion de-
duction could help establish a fund to begin to correct the damage to
Appalachia.9 The economic, environmental, and social problems of
Appalachia can be blamed directly on coal.1"' The extraction of coal
has made a few people and corporations wealthy, while consigning the
majority of residents to poverty, illness, and ecological devastation. 01
Infrastructure such as roads, airports, and educational facilities are
needed to make the region self-supporting and equal with the rest of
the country.
The federal government has set a precedent by paying repara-
tions to disparaged groups,0 2 and it is imperative that the government
do as much for the Appalachian mountaineers who have suffered this
historical injustice. Reparations should be delivered to town and
county governments to improve education, transportation, and infra-
structure. Mine owners, as beneficiaries of the coal, should pay indi-
rectly for such reparations through elimination of the depletion deduc-
tion. Without such funding, Appalachia will continue to be an
eyesore and an embarrassment to the rest of the nation. Reparations
could restore the beautiful green hills to their original majesty for the
benefit of all Americans.
98. BERGER, supra note 70, at 18; see also Ralph Nader & Richard Pollock, The Industry's
Worst Enemy, in NUCLEAR POWER: BOTH SIDES 141, 141-42 (Michio Kaku & Jennifer Trainer
eds., 1982).
99. See generally Davis, supra note 94.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. Reparations have been paid to Native Americans. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1408 (2001)
(establishing a fund to pay claims). Reparations have also been paid to Japanese Americans in-
carcerated during World War II. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1989(4)-(5), 1989a (2002).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The depletion deduction provided by Internal Revenue Code
section 611 deprives the U.S. government of billions in potential reve-
nue each year. The deduction is uncertain in application, resulting in
litigation expenses to determine entitlement, and encouraging the con-
tinued use of fossil fuels rather than the development of renewable en-
ergy sources that could be cleaner, safer, and cheaper. The purpose of
the deduction was to preserve capital investment in mineral rights,
which encouraged the exploitation of this nation's natural resources.0 3
The companies that invest in mineral rights no longer need this incen-
tive because the financial rewards of such investments are sufficient
without the depletion deduction. The uncertainty of return that ex-
isted when the deduction was enacted in 1909 no longer exists0 4 be-
cause technology is capable of determining the quantity and quality of
the recoverable minerals, thus virtually eliminating the risk of invest-
ment.
The depletion deduction should be eliminated, with the revenue
generated thereby used for development of renewable energy resources
and reparations to those areas most harmed by the use of fossil fuels.
The economy and the environment would be better served if the tax
policy of this nation favored renewable energy sources over fossil fuels.
103. See MERTENS, supra note 7, §§ 24-02, 24-11.
104. Id.
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